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INTRODUCTION
Early modern scholasticism had a great influence on private law and especially 
on contract law. One of the main areas of this influence was what we call today 
“freedom of contract” understood as an approach founded on the general theory 
of contract. This phrase may refer to two core issues of early modern contract 
law. The first one was the question of the actionability of naked agreements or in 
other words – the question of justification of the binding force of all agreements 
with a proper cause. The other one was a broad topic of voluntas and the vices of 
will of the parties, which affected the consent and the contract itself. Both of these 
topics contributed to the growth of concepts which finally led to the establishment 
of general theory of contract in 19th century. Probably it was the latter issue that 
would have been more likely chosen by the early modern theologians as the real 
question of freedom of contract, however, they did not use this heading for their 
argument.
Yet, this phrase appeared as the title of a chapter in a book on contracts of Paolo 
Comitoli (1545–1626).1 He was an Italian Jesuit, a moral theologian and an academ-
* This work has been supported by the National Science Centre, Poland (project no. 2016/21/N/
HS5/00014).
The author wants to express his gratitude to Prof. Dr. Wojciech Dajczak, Prof. Dr. Wim Decock 
and Dr. Adolfo Giuliani for their remarks on his research on Comitoli’s contract doctrine. The author 
takes the sole responsibility for any shortcomings of the presented paper.
1 Decock indicated Leonardus Lessius (1554–1623) as (possibly) the most relevant author who 
also used this phrase. See W. Decock, Jesuit freedom of contract, “Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiede-
nis” 2009, vol. 77, p. 425, note 9. See also P. Alexandrowicz, Kanonistyczne uzasadnienie swobody 
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ic teacher, who also did not refrain from an engagement in political issues of his 
time.2 He was the author of several works, his opus magnum was a big collection of 
responses – Responsa moralia (Lugduni 1609, Cremonae 1611, Rothomagi 1709),3 
but here we will focus on his Doctrina de contractu (Lugduni 1615, Rothomagi 
1709 – published as an appendix to Responsa),4 which will serve as the main source 
for examination of his contractual doctrine. Within this treatise Comitoli discussed 
libertas contractus. The aim of this study will be answering the questions of what 
he meant by this phrase and what his views on contractual freedom in the context 
of his general contract doctrine and early modern private law were.
To sketch the external landscape of Comitoli’s writings we should add a couple 
of general statements. Firstly, it is worth noting that at the threshold of modernity 
moral theology contributed a lot to the jurisprudence in general5 and to contract 
umów w zachodniej tradycji prawnej prawnej [Canonistic Justification of Freedom of Contract in 
the Western Legal Tradition], Poznań 2020, p. 128, note 102.
2 For an overview of Comitoli’s bio and works see P. Alexandrowicz, Paolo Comitoli SJ on 
Contracts, “Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte: Kanonistische Abteilung” 2021, 
vol. 107, pp. 255-263. For biographical data on Comitoli see: I. Marracci, Paulus Comitolus [in:] 
idem, Bibliothecae Marianae alphabetico ordine digestae et in duas partes divisae, Romae 1648, 
p. 208; L. Iacobillus, Bibliotheca Umbriae sive de scriptoribus Provinciae Umbriae Alphabetico 
Ordine Digesta, Fulginiae 1658, p. 218; Paulus Comitolus [in:] P. de Ribadeneira, P. Allegambe, 
N. Southwell (eds.), Bibliotheca scriptorum Societatis Iesu Opus inchoatum, Romae 1676, p. 647; 
A. Oldoino, Paulus Comitolus [in:] idem, Athenaeum augustum in quo Perusinorum scripta publice 
exponuntur, Perusiae 1678, pp. 269–271; G.B. Vermiglioli, Comitoli Paolo [in:] idem, Biografia 
degli scrittori perugini e notizie delle opere loro, vol. 1, Perugia 1829, p. 335; A. De Backer, Comi-
tolus, Paul [in:] A. De Baker et al. (eds.), Bibliothèque des écrivains de la Compagnie de Jésus: 
ou Notices bibliographiques, vol. 1, Paris 1869, col. 1344–1345; J. Müllendorf, Comitolus, Paul 
[in:] J. Hergenröther, F. Kaulen (eds.), Wetzer und Welte’s Kirchenlexikon oder Encyklopädie der 
katholischen Theologie und ihrer Hülfswisschaften, vol. 3, Freiburg im Breisgau 1884, col. 690–
691; C. Sommervogel, Comitoli, Paul [in:] C. Sommervogel (ed.), La Bibliothèque de la Compagnie 
de Jésus: Bibliographie, vol. 2, Bruxelles – Paris 1891, col. 1342–1343; P. Bernard, Comitoli Paul 
[in:] E. Mangenot et al. (eds.), Dictionnaire de théologie catholique: contenant l’exposé des doc-
trines de la théologie catholique, leurs preuves et leur histoire, vol. 3, Paris 1908, col. 308; A. De 
Bil, Comitoli Paolo [in:] A. De Meyer, É. Van Cuwenbergh et al. (eds.), Dictionnaire d’histoire et 
de géographie ecclésiastiques, vol. 13, Paris 1956, col. 366; J.P. Donnelly, Comitoli, Paolo [in:] 
C.E. O’Neill, J.M. Domínguez et al. (eds.), Diccionario histórico de la Compañía de Jesús, vol. 1, 
Roma – Madrid 2001, pp. 874–875; L.B. O’Neil, Comitoli, Paolo [in:] B. Marthaler (ed.), New 
Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 4, Detroit – Washington2 2003, p. 4; D.J. Osler, The Jurisprudence of 
the Baroque (Bibliographica iuridica 4; Studien zur europäischen Rechtsgeschichte 235), Frankfurt 
am Main 2009, p. 470; I. Birocchi, Comitoli, Paolo [in:] I. Birocchi, E. Cortese et al. (eds.), Dizion-
ario biografico dei giuristi italiani (XII–XX secolo), Bologna 2012, p. 565.
3 The first edition was examined in this paper [later referred to as: Doctrina].
4 The first edition was examined in this paper [later referred to as: Responsa].
5 See e.g. P. Grossi (ed.), La Seconda Scolastica nella formazione del diritto privato moderno. 
Atti dell’incontro di studio (Firenze, 16–19 ottobre 1972), Milano 1972, passim; P. Prodi, Una storia 
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law in particular.6 The direct influence of moral theology was possible due to the 
fusion of civil law, canon law, commercial law and customary laws into one body 
of laws which was called ius commune in the late Middle Ages. For many authors 
of the early modern period it was natural to take into consideration also the rules 
governing human conscience because forum internum – where they were of high 
importance – was treated as a separate and autonomous court.7 What happened in 
private law at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries may be called moral transfor-
mation of ius commune.8 Among many moral theologians involved in theological 
and legal disputes of this time Jesuits played the pivotal role. In fact, it is not 
without accuracy to say that the most significant contribution of the scholars from 
Societas Jesu to private law was the freedom of contract, i.e. the comprehensive 
attitude toward the vices of will.9 The late scholastics served also as advocates 
of freedom of contract as it was discovered by medieval canonists who claimed 
that every agreement was binding and should be kept.10 The school of ius naturae 
capitalized on these two facets of their contractual doctrines and in this respect 
perpetuated their achievements.
della giustizia, Bologna 2000, pp. 325–389; W. Decock, Theologians and Contract Law: The Moral 
Transformation of the Ius Commune (ca. 1500–1650), Leiden – Boston 2013, passim; W. Decock, 
C. Birr, Recht und Moral in der Scholastik der Frühen Neuzeit 1500–1750, Berlin 2016, pp. 23–30, 
77–87.
6 See e.g. K.-P. Nanz, Die Entstehung des allgemeinen Vertragsbegriffs im 16. bis 18. Jahrhun-
dert, München 1985, pp. 139–149; J. Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doc-
trine, Oxford 1991, pp. 69–111; I. Birocchi, Causa e categoria generale del contratto. Un problema 
dogmatico nella cultura privatistica dell’età moderna, vol. 1: Il Cinquecento, Torino 1997, pp. 203–
269; D. Poldnikov, Origins of General Concept of Contract in Western European Legal Science 
(12th through 16th Centuries), “Journal on European History of Law” 2016, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 57–58.
7 See e.g. W. Decock, Jesuit freedom..., pp. 431–435.
8 The phrase is taken from the title of Decock’s book.
9 W. Decock, Jesuit freedom..., pp. 441–458.
10 On medieval canon law jurisprudence and discovery of freedom of contract see from the vast 
literature e.g. F. Spies, De l’observation des simple conventions en droit canonique, Paris 1928; 
J. Roussier, Le fondement de l’obligation contractuelle dans le droit classique de l’Église, Paris 
1933; M. Roberti, L’influenza cristiana nello svolgimento storico dei patti nudi [in:] M. Roberti 
et al. (eds.), Cristianesimo e diritto romano, Milano 1935, pp. 85–116; P. Fedele, Considerazioni 
sull’efficacia dei patti nudi nel diritto canonico, “Annali dell’Università di Macerata” 1937, vol. 11, 
pp. 115–200; P. Bellini, L’obbligazione da promessa con oggetto temporale nel sistema canonistico 
classico, Milano 1964; P. Landau, Pacta sunt servanda. Zu den kanonistischen Grundlagen des Pri-
vatautonomie [in:] M. Ascheri et al. (eds.), Ins Wasser geworfen und Ozeane durchquert. Festschrift 
für Knut Wolfgang Nörr, Köln – Weimar – Wien 2003, pp. 457–474; F. Scigliano, Spunti per una 
riconsiderazione del principio canonistico ex nudo pacto oritur actio, “Studi Urbinati. A – Scienze 
giuridiche, politiche ed economiche” 2007, vol. 58, fasc. 1, pp. 123–55.
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1. LIBERTAS CONTRACTUS ACCORDING TO PAOLO COMITOLI
1.1. Broad context: Freedom of contract  
in Comitoli’s contractual doctrine
In case of the works of Paolo Comitoli it is rather obvious what we may con-
sider freedom of contract due to the fact that he himself used precisely this term to 
discuss some important questions of the general doctrine of contract. The formula 
libertas contractus appeared as the heading of the fourth chapter from the second 
book of his Doctrina and the following nine chapters were also dedicated to explain 
its meaning. Therefore, it seems necessary to give a short insight into his general 
concept of contract.
The main aim of Doctrina was to present contract with the use of a new scientific 
method, as claimed the full title of this treatise: Doctrina de contractu universe ad 
scientiae methodum revocato in tres partes distributa. The method Comitoli used 
was based on the application of Aristotelian principles to the lecture on contract. 
Therefore, it was crucial for Comitoli to provide a proper definition of contract 
founded on the comprehension of the causes and aims of contract and to explain 
the characteristics of contract. The important feature of Comitoli’s scientific 
approach was also the tendency to take into consideration broad theological and 
philosophical contexts of the discussed problems as well as to organize his reflec-
tion with frequent listing and plethora of enumerations and divisions. Providing 
definitions of significant legal concepts was an essential part of works focused at 
the methodical approach.
The definition of contract as it was proposed by Comitoli grew from his desire 
to grasp all causes of contract into one definition. According to him, contract was 
the legal consent of at least two wills, the inviting and the invited, which arose 
from the cause of ownership and donation, to perform or not to perform any action, 
signalled externally and established for the wellbeing of the state and of the man-
kind.11 The aim of contract (final cause) was expressed as the general wellbeing 
of all mankind. The efficient cause were the wills of the parties, the formal cause 
was the consent between the parties expressed by an external sign to act or not to 
act, the material cause was the subject of contract which Comitoli saw as a kind of 
transfer of broadly understood property. He combined these four causes to estab-
11 P. Comitoli, Doctrina, pars 1, cap. 4, n. 10, p. 11: Contractus est minimum duarum volun-
tatum, provocantis et provocatae, quae dominio rationis ac rei praeditae sint, legitima consensio 
ad rem aliquam agendam, vel non agendam, externo aliquo signo declarata, atque ad civitatum 
humanique generis bonum instituta.
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lish his definition of contract.12 The most important element of this formula was 
the focus on the consent of contracting parties, more precisely – consent of wills. 
At this point we can already see how important the circumstances of expressing 
the consent were for Comitoli. The definition of contract implied the significance 
of questions about the factors that may influence the will of a party to contract. 
However, the problem of libertas contractus was addressed by Comitoli only in 
the middle part of his treatise.
1.2. Narrow context: The attributes of contract
The detailed second part of Doctrina was dedicated to the presentation of the 
twelve attributes of contract. It was the most elaborated part of Comitoli’s treatise 
and it was his most original concept. By these twelve attributes he understood the 
specific characteristics of every contract and he discussed the fundamental issues of 
contract law around them. These included: necessitas, utilitas, libertas, contraria 
pactio, bona fides, soliditas, iustitia, honestas, benignitas expressam vel tacitam 
habens donationem, obligatio, actio, dominii translatio. The order of these attributes 
was not accidental. It resulted from the definition of contract and the causes of 
contract as they were presented by Comitoli. He explained the connection between 
the attributes, which also contributed to the chosen order of their presentation.13
Some of them were rather obvious (like iustitia, obligatio, actio), but some 
of them might have been a kind of surprise for a reader. For example, soliditas 
of contract meant that the contract needed a real subject and not a fictitious one, 
benignitas was Comitoli’s idea that in every contract there was a hidden gratuitous 
benefit or donation, honestas was a name given to the requirement for contract to 
meet the standards of boni mores. The depth and breadth of the analysis of each 
attribute varied – it took the Jesuit between half a chapter up to ten chapters to grasp 
their nature. He usually began with the account of the former doctrine and on the 
basis of its evaluation he built his own definitions to which he added the lists of 
specific questions important for the discussed attribute.
12 This definition was expressly rebutted by Pedro de Oñate. See P. de Oñate, De contractibus 
tomi tres, vol. 1: De contractibus in genere, Romae 1646, tract. 1, disp. 1, sectio 3, num. 14, p. 5. 
See also in this context I. Birocchi, Causa e categoria..., p. 277, note 19; W. Decock, Theologians 
and Contract Law..., pp. 173–174, note 614, and p. 511.
It is worth mentioning that causa was a broad issue discussed in contractual doctrine at least 
since the late Middle Ages and thanks to the canonists it became an important point in the devel-
opment of contract law. It seems, however, that Comitoli represented a more general approach to 
causa as he discussed in the Aristotelian manner the four causes of contract without clear link to the 
question of actionability of all agreements.
13 For more details see P. Alexandrowicz, Paolo Comitoli..., pp. 272-297.
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1.3. Libertas contractus as the attribute of contract
The freedom of contract was listed as the fourth attribute of contract. Comitoli 
saw this attribute as a one connected to the efficient cause of contract.14 Therefore, 
the wills of the parties stood in the centre of the freedom of contract as the contract 
resulted from the consent of two dialoguing wills. Comitoli dedicated ten chapters 
(numbered 4–13 from the second book of Doctrina) to discuss various types of 
contractual freedom and the questions important for its understanding15. It was the 
biggest number of chapters for one attribute, which already indicates the importance 
of this topic for the Italian Jesuit. These chapters were titled as follows:
4. De libertate contractus.
5. Definitio consilii a Damasceno allata explicatur.
6. De secunda libertate contractus, quae est voluntarii, ignorantiam et errorem, 
quamvis dolo careant, excludentis.
7. De dolo et fraude, et num contractum efficiant nullum.
8. Duodecim discrimina inter culpam iuridicam et dolum enucleantur.
9. De culpa iuridica, quae in contractus incurrit.
10. De libertate vim metumque excludente.
11. An reverentiae et observantiae metus contractus inanes et cassos efficiat.
12. Blanditia et adulatio efficiantne contractum nullum, cum eius sunt causae.
13. Num importunae preces contractus irrites faciant.
Within these chapters Comitoli presented his attitude towards freedom of con-
tract and therefore their content will be the main issue of the further study. However, 
it is worth noting that he placed similar elucidations at the beginning of the book 
on contracts in his Responsa moralia.16 It was not only a typical moral casebook 
but it also contained a lot of theoretical explanations. These initial chapters will 
also be taken into consideration below.
Probably, the most striking in Comitoli’s account of freedom of contract is 
the title of the first chapter devoted to the third attribute of contract. As a separate 
heading it sounds very modern, like a title from a modern handbook on contracts 
rather than a chapter from an early modern moral theologian. Comitoli claimed that 
there are three types of necessary freedom of contract: the first was freedom of will 
(libertas rationi, consilii, atque electionis), the second may be called the require-
ment of voluntariness (libertas spontanei, seu voluntarii, quae abiicit inscientiam, 
14 P. Comitoli, Doctrina, pars 2, cap. 1, num. 3, p. 55; pars 3, cap. 3, num. 2, p. 195. See also 
on causa conficiens: ibidem, pars 1, cap. 4, num. 6, pp. 9–10.
15 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 4–13, pp. 59–93.
16 P. Comitoli, Responsa, lib. 3, q. 1–3, pp. 353–360.
 LIBERTAS CONTRACTUS. PAOLO COMITOLI SJ ON FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 187
errorem, dolum, fraudem, vim, atque terrorem) and the third was what we may call 
freedom of ownership (libertas dominii aut perfecti, aut imperfecti).17 The core 
of his argument was the second type of contractual freedom, as the vices of will 
were a common issue in early modern contract law. However, it seems adequate 
to explain all types of freedom of contract separately to show the complexity of 
Comitoli’s idea hidden behind the wording libertas contractus. We may add that 
the next attribute, contraria pactio, was somehow connected to the freedom of 
contract but not in the way that would enrich the reflection on Comitoli’s concept 
of this freedom.18
2. THE FIRST: FREEDOM OF WILL (LIBERTAS VOLUNTATIS)
The first type of freedom of contract required more philosophical than legal 
explanation. To justify the separation of this particular kind of freedom Comitoli 
used the authority of many renowned authors and there is very little of his own 
input in this part except for the arrangement of auctoritates. The Perusian Jesuit 
collected various names of this freedom and briefly explained each of them.19 
Libertas naturae meant that it was the most intrinsic freedom of human nature, 
rooted in human reason as it was capable of cognition and action. It was also lib-
ertas a coactione et a necessitate as both of these excluded the freedom of human 
reason. It was properly called libertas rationis because it was necessary that a man 
was a free judge over his or her own acts. Human reason was by itself the first 
cause of freedom in a human and only because it enabled a human the proper cog-
nition was it possible that a human was able to choose and act. It was also simply 
called libertas voluntatis, i.e. the freedom of will, as it aimed at specific objectives. 
Therefore, it was also libertas electionis, as the choices of a human were the steps 
to reach an objective. To make choices was possible because a human was able 
to freely evaluate the moral value of them, which is why the proper name of this 
freedom was also libertas arbitrii.
Comitoli explained each of these names with references to common sources, 
especially Aristotle, Augustine, Gregory of Nyssa, John of Damascus, Anselm of 
Canterbury, Peter Lombard, Bernard of Clairvaux and Thomas Aquinas. We may 
state that by references to these philosophers Comitoli gave the reader in short the 
essence of the Christian teachings on free will.
What he found particularly important was the definition given by John of 
Damascus, namely the definition of deliberation (which however is not the fully 
satisfactory equivalent of Latin consilium). Comitoli quoted from John’s De fide 
17 P. Comitoli, Doctrina, pars 2, cap. 4, num. 1, p. 59.
18 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 14, pp. 93–96.
19 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 4, num. 1–7, pp. 59–61.
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orthodoxa: Consilium est appetitus inquisitivus de rebus agendis, quae in nobis 
sunt.20 He explained this definition and its significance for the first freedom of 
contract. There were four elements required for consilium: to investigate the means 
for reaching an objective, to make orders for will, to consult about the actions to 
perform, to deliberate on the things which are in one’s power. With the use of Ar-
istotle and Simplicius he went into a detailed analysis of terminology which was 
the most suitable for discussion on deliberation, intention and desire (e.g. on the 
question whether the efficient cause is in desire or cognition). At the end he noted 
that many people acted without a proper deliberation and were coaxed by other 
less relevant factors.
Comitoli listed also five differences between the first and the second freedom 
of contract.21 Free will was not excluded by the vices of will as was voluntariness. 
The former was an attribute of human actions, whereas the latter was a require-
ment for civil actions. Free will was used in any action, while voluntariness was 
important only in making agreements. The use of freedom of will did not result 
in the obligation for the others, as it was the case with voluntariness which led to 
the rise of a bond of law. Finally, to perform an action with the use of free will one 
did not need anyone else engaged, but the action of making agreement required 
voluntariness from both parties.
It seems to be a good summary of how Comitoli understood the first type of 
freedom of contract. It was not a strictly legal concept, but rather an application 
of Christian views on free will to the legal doctrine. It was a preliminary require-
ment which should be examined in case of any human action and therefore it was 
proper to stress that also in contracts every man should act with the use of free 
will. However, apart from some general indication that men should act directed by 
a fine deliberation and not driven by other incentives, the complex philosophical 
background of free will was of little importance for contract law. The reader of 
Comitoli’s treatise may feel that it was slightly artificial to add the passage on free 
will in the general theory of contract, but it was consistent for the Jesuit as he often 
made erudite additions to his main lecture.
3. THE SECOND: VOLUNTARINESS (LIBERTAS VOLUNTARII)
The second type of freedom of contract may be called voluntariness and it 
should be seen as a right issue in general contract law. As we may deduce from the 
introductory remarks, the discussion of this freedom was in fact the question of the 
20 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 5, num. 1, p. 61.
21 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 4, num. 7, pp. 61–62.
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influence of vices of will on the validity of contract.22 Apart from the initial remark 
on the name of this freedom (libertas spontanei, libertas voluntarii) Comitoli did 
not discuss its nature in general. Hence, it is necessary to picture voluntariness by 
the description of the vices of will. Firstly, Comitoli noted six vices of will while 
introducing the second type of contractual freedom to the reader (inscientia, error, 
dolus, fraus, vis, terror23). Secondly, he listed again six of these but replaced terror 
with metus.24 Taking into consideration the titles of the chapters dedicated to the 
second type of contractual freedom, one may list even more circumstances which 
may be seen as potentially influential on the parties’ consent. Therefore, below we 
will see how Comitoli discussed this issue by following his order of argument. The 
focus will be on Comitoli’s evaluation of the influence of the vices on the validity 
of contract and on the most recent sources which served the Jesuit in his Doctrina.
3.1. Ignorantia and error
The Italian Jesuit began the chapter in the way he used to start when a new issue 
arrived, i.e. with definitions. Right at the beginning he said that among theologians 
there were notable differences in the usage of the words ignorantia and error, 
whereas among jurists they were used interchangeably without detriment.25 Still, 
he found it necessary to provide the reader with many definitions and philosophical 
explanations on error, ignorance and the relation between these two. His own sug-
gestion was to understand ignorance as lack of cognition in mind (ignorantia est 
in intellectu creato cognitionis privatio).26 Comitoli reached here for the writings 
of Augustine, Guillaume d’Auvergne, Henry of Ghent, Aquinas.27
Then he moved forward to discuss the legal influence of ignorantia and error 
on contract. He said that when someone agreed to contract deceived by ignorance or 
error, the contract would have been void, unless he had not entered it otherwise. The 
reason behind this statement was that it was the requirement of free consent of the 
parties.28 To this he added the notice on the difference between private obligations 
22 Extensively on the vices of will in early modern moral theology see e.g. J. Gordley, The 
Philosophical Origins..., pp. 82–93; W. Decock, Theologians and Contract Law..., pp. 215–327.
23 P. Comitoli, Doctrina, pars 2, cap. 4, num. 1, p. 59.
24 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 4, num. 7, p. 61; pars 3, cap. 3, num. 2, p. 195.
25 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 6, num. 1, p. 64: Ignorantiam atque errorem non vocabulo tantum, sed re 
etiam a Theologis distringui haud me latet. Verum ipsi in hac disceptatione more Iurisconsultorum 
utrumqe verbum confuse atque permist usurpabimus.
26 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 6, num. 2, p. 64.
27 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 6, num. 1–5, pp. 64–65.
28 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 6, num. 6, pp. 65–66: Verumenim ipsi, ut in hoc capite a primo professi 
sumus, ignorantiae nomine errorem quoque notabimus: illudque vere nos in contrahendi ratione 
asseverare posse arbitramur, cum quis sua ignorantia suoque errore deceptus, quem errorem et 
ignorantiam pusilla diligentia studioque adhibito profligare potuisset, contractum cum altero init, 
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and those imposed by law, as well as on the significance of good faith in the context 
of ignorance. He gave some examples to show that good faith was necessary to claim 
that contract was void, as it was in the case when someone bought a thing from an 
apparently sane man without knowing he was insane so the sale was void.29 After 
his general reference to theologians, Comitoli interestingly noted that inequality 
did not always lead to the nullity of contract but the lack of consent was always 
the cause of nullity of contract because in the parties’ consent there was placed 
a form of contract.30 The last two paragraphs of this chapter Comitoli dedicated to 
the rejection of an opinion of moral theologians (he mentioned especially Juan de 
Medina), according to which when one party was deceived by their own ignorance, 
the contract was valid in conscience. For Comitoli even in the case of voluntary 
ignorance, the contract should be void when such an ignorance led to the consent 
as the consent pertained to voluntary obligations and they required voluntariness.31 
On the example of ignorantia and error we can see how consistent Comitoli was 
in defence of his preliminary premises on the condition of wills to freely agree 
upon consent for contract. Voluntariness was a requirement which at some points 
had influence of Comitoli’s solutions of specific cases.
3.2. Dolus and fraus
The next chapter dealt with dolus and fraus and their impact on the validity of 
contract. No other questions in the general contract doctrine of this period were 
more popular than these regarding dolus and fraus. Their significance, however, 
had a long history as it was proved by Comitoli, when he tried to grasp the nature of 
these two phenomena. He used his usual method, i.e. the collection and comparison 
of plethora of definitions and specific divisions. At the beginning of his reflection 
quem sciens et non deceptus nullo modo iniisset, contractum nullum existere, ideo quod consensus 
defuit liber [...].
29 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 6, num. 7, p. 66: Huius verissimae asseverationis exempla ad persua-
dendum apposita subiiciamus. Rem ab homine insano, quem sanae mentis fore credebas, ipse emis: 
postea tibi renunciatur hominem illum amentem esse, tua bona fide incolumi contractus est nullus.
30 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 6, num. 7, p. 66: quippe qui magis qam aequalias est contractui neces-
sarius neque enim iustitiae violatio contractum semper dissolvit: at dissensus, sive non esse assen-
sum, contractum semper everit, cum in consensu forma sit posita contractus.
31 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 6, num. 8, pp. 66–67: Multo vero minus probare possum, quod Medina 
[...] affirmate scripsit: quando dolus a venditore non est appositus, sed a seipso deceptus est emp-
tor, ut quiq lapidem emit vitreum, quem putabat esse pretiosum, aut ad certum morbum curandum 
valere, si ad emendum ignorantia, ut is loquitur, vincibili adductus est, iure conscientiae non irritum 
esse contractum [...]. Ipsi enim dicimus quamvis eiusmodi ignorantia voluntarium, aut deliberatio-
nis, aut electionis, aut actionis, ut humana est, non tollat, tollit tamen ut parens est obligationis ex 
contractu. Ac licet non tollat voluntarium culpae in iis rebus, quae ignorari non debent: at tollit in 
iis de quibus inter se homines contrahunt voluntarium obligationis atque consensus.
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on the validity of deceitfully made contracts he pointed out that he had discussed 
this question in his Responsa but it still required a more comprehensive answer.32 
Comitoli said that it was necessary to distinguish between two types of contract, 
contractus spiritualis and contractus temporalis. The former (e.g. vows or marriage) 
was valid as long as it was good for the party who had been deceived and the consent 
was agreed freely because it led to the greater good. It was generally accepted that 
when a deceit was the cause for a mundane contract (which was also called civil 
contract), the agreement was void as it was against the will of the deceived party.
However, in their detailed analysis of this issue the learned authors differed 
a lot, so Comitoli decided to formulate a couple of general rules in this respect.33 
The first one was the statement accepted by communis opinio that when dolus of 
one party led the other one to agree on a purchase which he or she would not have 
entered without dolus, the contract had been void. The main reason behind this 
rule was that it was the case similar to error – voluntariness and free consent were 
cancelled by dolus.34 From the second one we can learn that when the parties acted 
in good faith and it was the agent who caused dolus, the contract was valid, although 
the party who was made worse off had the right to sue both the agent and the other 
party. This was a case of disagreement between the learned authors, as some of 
them claimed that on forum internum such a contract was void, but Comitoli did 
not belong to this group.35 According to the third rule, in the case of dolus there 
was no point in dividing contracts into bonae fidei and stricti iuris because – as 
famously stated by Baldus – according to canon law all contracts were bonae fidei. 
(Here we can mention that this controversy and its’ solution by Baldus was the 
32 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 8, num. 12, pp. 71–72.
33 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 8, num. 13, p. 72: Distingui solet a Doctoribus contractus genus: aut 
enim spiritualis est contractus, ut religionis votum, ut coniugum: aut civilis, seu temporalis. si spir-
itualis est, et bono ei, qui fallitur, contractus est ratus; quoniam in eo non proprius versatur dolus. 
Itaque si dolo te ad sanum aliquod virorum domicilium pellexi, in quo sollemnia obedientiae, pau-
pertatis, et castitatis vota nuncupasti, susceptae disciplinae ac vitae te paenitere non potest; quo-
niam quod tibi salutare et optimum est, delegisti: et consensus liber intercessit, sine quo nec con-
tractus spiritualis ratus esse posset. In rebus caducis contrahendis si quis decipiatur, quoniam qui 
fallitur, amittit quod nollet, ac damnum sustinet, nec Dei, nec hominum lex statuit ratum esse quod 
pernicioso dolo actum est, quando dolus adhibitus fuit huiusmodi, ut causam contractui attulerit.
34 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 8, num. 14, p. 72: Primum perceptum: Si dolus ab alterutro contrahen-
tium structus fecit, ut alter, verbi causa, emeret, quod sine dolo numquam emisset, ex maxime com-
muni sententia magistrorum est nulla emptio, atque venditio, etiamsi nonnulli secus fuerint opinati 
[...]. Huc accedit, quod error tollit consensum, ut in cap. 9 demonstratum est: at dolus inquinatur 
non quovis errore, sed eo a quo humana voluntas abhorret maxime. Itaque tollit voluntarium et 
consensum liberum.
35 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 8, num. 16, pp. 72–73: Secundum perceptum: Si doli auctor et causa 
fallax contrahendi fuit proxeneta, in contrahentibus bona fide conservata, valet contractus: sed 
actio datur doli adversus proxenetam, qui si non sit solvendo, is cui bono fuit contractus, alteri, cui 
nocuit, praestabit id omne, in quo factus est locupletior [...].
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sole content of Comitoli’s reflection on dolus in Responsa36). Comitoli added that 
dolus in stricti iuris contract had the same effect on consent as dolus in bonae fidei 
contract had on the cause of contract. In both types of contract there was needed 
voluntariness which was excluded by dolus.37 The fourth rule said that in the case 
of dolus incidens the deceived party was entitled to either nullify the contract or 
to claim the other party to bring the balance between benefits e.g. by a correction 
of the price. In the latter solution the free will of the party would be sufficiently 
restored.38 Fifthly, the penultimate rule was concerned with dolus incidens in con-
tract stricti iuris, and Comitoli referred here to his argument from the other part 
of the book on the division of contracts. The last rule stated that when dolus was 
rooted in the lack of knowledge of the parties, one could not speak about any sin 
in their actions. In such a case there were also slight changes in the rules regarding 
the equation of benefits according to the level of parties’ deliberation.39
In his presentation of each rule Comitoli added some more specific arguments. 
It is a good opportunity to see which early modern authors influenced his concepts 
on this specific topic. Here he referred most frequently to the arguments given by 
Konrad Summenhart (ca. 1458–1502),40 Juan de Medina (Medina, 1490–1547), 
36 P. Comitoli, Responsa, lib. 3, q. 1, pp. 353–356.
37 P. Comitoli, Doctrina, pars 2, cap. 8, num. 17, p. 73: Tertium perceptum: Etiamsi Doctores 
tradant hoc discrimen esse inter contractus bonae fidei, et stricti iuris, quod illi propter dolum initi 
fiant irriti, hi autem rati; id quod ex legibus quoque non obscure colligitur, nihilosecius mihi semper 
sententia Baldi placuit, qui [...] profitetur iure canonum contractus omnes bonae fidei esse [...]. Si 
enim dolus in contractus irruens stricti iuris consensum tollit non secus, quam cum tamquam causa 
perimit contractus bonae fidei; cur non stricti iuris iuxta irriti censendi erunt, atque bonae fidei; 
cum in utroque genere desideretur similiter voluntarium.
38 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 8, num. 18, p. 73: Quartum perceptum: Quando dolus incidit in contrac-
tum; ut quia exempli causa emptor rem sibi venditam optabat, iusto pretio persoluto: sed venditor 
illi imposuit, multo maiore pretio poscendo, quod sane ad iustitiam et aequalitatem rediget, nisi 
volet rescindere contractum. nam in potestate esse eius, qui pretio circumvenit, aut rescindere con-
tractum, aut ad aequalitatem eum revocare, sentiunt fere, qui in huius loci explicatione versantur. 
Ergo duplicem habet perceptum hoc animadversionem. Altera est, contractum in eum incidente dolo 
valere, quia vere amborum contrahentium consensum liberum habuit in rei venalis substantia, licet 
per errorem alter pretii quantitati minime consenserit, ut merito dolus emendatione egeat [...].
39 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 8, num. 21, p. 74: Sextum perceptum: Si dolus evenit re ipsa in contractu 
ob inscitiam contrahentium, quia, verbi causa, rei pretium, vel rerum aequalitatem ignorabant, 
nullum admittitur peccatum: neque hic error doli nomine appellandus foret. Hoc igitur tertio modo 
si accidat dolus, emptor venditori non cogetur rem emptam restituere, quamvis minoris emerit, nisi 
repetatur, si a principio hoc deliberatum habuit, non pluris emere; sin a principio hoc ili cerum erat 
pluris emere, cognito iusto rei pretio, vel illud impendet, vel certe rem ipsam reddet [...].
40 In the brackets there are given the name of author as was used by Comitoli and his dates of 
life. The first author mentioned above, referred to as Corradus, might have been also completely dif-
ferent scholar, i.e. Giovanni Battista Corradi (ca. 1530–1606), a Dominican preacher born in Perugia 
(like Comitoli), who wrote Responsa ad cuiuscunque pene generis, casuum conscientiae. The clear 
references to Summenhart works and ideas prove that he was the one behind the reference Corradus. 
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Diego de Covarrubias y Leyva (Covarruvias, 1512–1577). To these he added also 
references to Angelo Carleto de Clavasio (Angelus, 1411–1495), Giovanni Cagnaz-
zo (Tabiensis, ?–1521), Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio (Prierias, 1456/1457–1527) 
and Gabriel Vásquez (Gabriel, 1549/1551–1604). Angelus, Tabiensis and Prierias 
were authors of summae to the cases of conscience, i.e. these sources were not 
strictly legal works. Most of the above-mentioned writers were moral theologians 
rather than jurists. It is particularly worth mentioning that Comitoli had a special 
inclination toward the arguments of Summenhart, 15th century German theologian 
and canonist. The fine example of his influence on Comitoli was that the latter paid 
great attention to the definition of contract given by Summenhart.41 However, in this 
short part of Doctrina Comitoli did not refer directly Summenhart’s opus magnum, 
i.e. Septipertitum opus de contractibus pro foro conscientiae atque theologico, but 
he referred to Compendium, seu epitome questionum de contractibus which was 
an addition to this main work of Summenhart.42
In case of dolus and fraus in contract law Comitoli hardly proposed any new 
solutions. He gathered the discussed issues under one heading and presented an 
elegant enumeration of specific rules but the content of these rules was taken by 
him from the earlier authors, mostly moral theologians. By no means is this an 
assault on the Jesuit – it is rather a statement that on this narrow example we can 
see that Comitoli remained a moral theologian of his age and even while discussing 
the general contract doctrine he stuck to casuistry to explain its facets. Of course, 
in other parts of his Doctrina, Comitoli referred to many other authorities. In total 
he used the works of over a hundred different authors, reaching from the Sacred 
Scripture up to his early modern fellow theologians. From the last group of authors 
he most willingly referred to the above-mentioned writers, to whom we may obvi-
ously add many more theologians, like Bartolomeo Fumo (Armillas), who seemed 
to be also particularly important for Comitoli.
Before discussing the next couple of vices of will, Comitoli placed two chapters 
on the subject of culpa iuridica. In the first one he listed the differences between 
dolus malus and culpa iuridica. Among them we can find a clear statement that 
dolus at the beginning of an agreement resulted in the nullification of contract be-
cause it was against boni mores and both divine and human laws.43 Then he focused 
On Giovanni Battista Corradi see e.g. R. Coulon, Corrado Jean-Baptiste [in:] E. Mangenot et al. 
(eds.), Dictionnaire de théologie catholique..., col. 1906–1907.
41 P. Comitoli, Doctrina, pars 1, cap. 1, pp. 2–4. Cf. K. Summenhart, Septipertitum opus de 
contractibus pro foro conscientiae atque theologico, Hagenau 1515, tract. 1, q. 16, conclusio 4, s.f. 
On Summenhart’s definition see e.g. I. Birocchi, Causa e categoria..., pp. 214–219.
42 P. Comitoli, Doctrina, pars 2, cap. 8, num. 14, p. 72. 
43 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 8, num. 4, p. 75: Pactum inter contrahentes initum, ut qui dolose in con-
tractu, vel ex contractu egerit, non teneatur nomine doli, est nullum: quia est contra bonos mores, 
contra ius omne divinum et humanum.
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on culpa, its definitions and divisions, and many questions referring to culpa in 
contracts. He described e.g. the significance of culpa in contracts in general and he 
discussed many types of contracts paying special attention to the types and forms of 
possible culpa appearing in them.44 It seems that for Comitoli culpa was a subject 
tightly related to voluntariness of contract, though, there are no direct implications 
of this statement for the nullity of contract.
3.3. Vis and metus
The next two typical vices of will were vis and metus (or terror). In Doctrina 
Comitoli only briefly addressed these two due to the fact that he had written two 
chapters on them in Responsa. In the first one the Jesuit explicitly indicated the 
list of authors on whom he relied in discussing the influence of metus on contract. 
Apart from the sources of Roman and canon law there were medieval canonists 
and theologians together with many moral theologians of his age. Comitoli’s aim 
was to present a short summary of the questions concerned with duress.45 Firstly, 
he gathered the sources which briefly justified the importance of metus for the 
validity of contract (X 4.1.14, 1.40.2; D. 4,2,1). Contract was made on the basis of 
consent so metus had to be excluded from it and in general ius could not arise from 
any iniuria.46 Next he introduced the division of duress according to the degree of 
coercion. Coactio sufficiens was not the case of metus because metus needed to be 
caused externally, and in this type coercion was absolute and intrinsic and it was 
against will. The other type, coactio inducens, might happen in the case of metus 
because it could make the will choose under the influence of duress but it did not 
exclude free will.47 He followed with the division of the level of metus depending 
on whether its subject was vir constans or vir inconstans and the examples of metus 
which feared the constant man.48 Answering the next question about the charac-
teristics of such a duress Comitoli mentioned that it was a probable issue for his 
44 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 9, num. 8–16, pp. 79–81.
45 P. Comitoli, Responsa, lib. 3, q. 2, num. 1, p. 356.
46 Ibidem, lib. 3, q. 2, num. 2, p. 356: Sine consensu autem non perficitur contractus [...]. Adde, 
quod non nascitur ius ex iniuria: cum igitur metum inferre alteri, et terrore ac minis illum cogere 
ad quidpiam agendum, iniuria sit, non videtur ex ea ius aliquod verum in contractu existere posse.
47 Ibidem, lib. 3, q. 2, num. 3, p. 356: Secundum quaesitum. Cum metus efficiat coactionem in 
voluntatis actu, qui est velle, sive electio; duplex autem cogitari possit coactio, una sufficiens, sive 
absoluta; altera inducens sive condicionata [...]. Utram coactionem gignere potest metus, ac vis 
extrinsecus allata? Respondeo, non primam [...] sed secundam, id est, conditionatam seu inducen-
tem [...]; quid enim magis voluntarium, quam velle, propter quod reliqua omnia censentur, et sunt 
voluntaria: inductiva tamen, et conditionata coactione cogi potest voluntas ac consensus: propterea 
quod voluntas propter timorem quarumdam rerum, et propter quaedam alia, nonnulla eligit, quibus 
sublatis eadem nollet.
48 Ibidem, lib. 3, q. 2, num. 4–5, pp. 356–357.
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consideration of freedom of contract and he stated that duress of a constant man 
had to be sudden, heavy and unjust.49 Next he described the attributes of a judge 
appropriate to determine the weight of duress.50 Finally, he provided the reader 
with the list of actions which required a free consent and might be claimed void 
due to the fact that there was metus capable to fear a constant man (among them 
Comitoli counted e.g. satisfactio, confessio, marriage, iurisdictio, absolving from 
excommunication, witnesses of will, vow).51 The last question concerned the nul-
lity ipso iure of contracts entered with disruption of the same heavy type of metus. 
According to civil law, such contracts were not void but they were voidable via 
the decision of a judge, whereas according to law of conscience, they were null. 
The former was founded on common opinion and the latter was agreed among 
theologians with some exceptions which were addressed by Comitoli. In the court 
of conscience it may be said that there was no difference between light duress and 
heavy duress as they both were sufficient to declare the contract void. However, 
he also referred to the opinion of Adrian of Utrecht who stressed that metus should 
be illegal and against boni mores.52
The second chapter from Responsa was dedicated to metus levis and its evalu-
ation on forum internum. Here Comitoli dived into a very subtle discourse on the 
influence of metus levis on contract on forum internum and he fiercely rebutted three 
arguments against his (and many others’) opinion that metus levis did not lead to 
the nullity of contract. The first argument requires our special attention. Comitoli 
first demonstrated the opinion which he wanted to fight against. It claimed i.a. that 
metus levis did not affect the validity of marriage. Here Comitoli made probably 
49 Ibidem, lib. 3, q. 2, num. 6, p. 357: Quintum quaesitum. Sed quaenam esset apposita definitio 
metus cadentis in constantem virum? Haec nobis probabilis visa est aliquando in nostra disputatio-
ne de libertate contractus. Metus cadens in constantem virum est instantis, gravis, iniustique mali ab 
homine sibi inferendi vehemens opinio. The use of word probabilis by Comitoli in this case is rather 
without deeper meaning but it is worth noting that he was remembered as the adversary of proba-
bilism, which made him dissident among his fellow Jesuits. See e.g. T. Deman, Probabilisme [in:] 
É. Amman et al. (eds.), Dictionnaire de théologie catholique: contenant l’exposé des doctrines de la 
théologie catholique, leurs preuves et leur histoire, vol. 13.1, Paris 1936, col. 497–498; R. Schüßler, 
Moral im Zweifel, vol. 2: Die Herausforderung des Probabilismus, Paderborn 2006, pp. 62–65.
50 P. Comitoli, Responsa, lib. 3, q. 2, num. 7, pp. 357–358.
51 Ibidem, lib. 3, q. 2, num. 7, p. 358.
52 Ibidem, lib. 3, q. 2, num. 8, p. 358: Octavum quaesitum. Contractus initi metu cadente in 
constantem virum, sunt ne ipso iure nulli? Respondeo, iure civili non videri nullos, sed rescindendos 
officio et auctoritate iudicis: est communis sententia: sed iure conscientiae existimo esse nullos 
[...]. Quaerat aliquis, num in foro DEI et conscientiae vis par sit metus levis ac Vehementis: ita, ut 
propter utrumque fiat contractus irritus seu irritandus [...]. Prudenter autem admonet Adrianus [...] 
metum esse debere iniuriosum, et contra bonos mores, non quem magistratus iuste incutit, quicum-
que tamdem is sit metus, sive cadat in animum constantem, et fortem, sive in imbecillum. Quid enim 
magis pugnat cum ratione, iustitiae et aequitate, quam ex iniuria alterius gigni ius illi quid piam 
necesario praestandi?
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the most interesting observation on the nature of contractual freedom. He argued 
that when there was a contract entered due to unjust duress it was not possible that 
this injustice gave any right to the party who caused duress. Conversely, this party 
was forced to satisfy the other one and the only possible satisfaction was in this 
case restitutio in integrum because contract involved commutative justice. The 
main reason was that the contractual freedom of the abused party had been vio-
lated. Comitoli said that it was not possible to restore the initial state of affairs as 
long as the abused party had not recovered their full freedom. He stressed that this 
attribute of contract was a highly important and very intrinsic feature of contract. 
Therefore, any violation of this attribute resulted in the nullity of contract. To this 
explicit argument he added that in such a case it was iniuria that was nullified and 
it may happen by law or by the decision of a judge even if the violated parties did 
not want to terminate contract themselves. It was the law of nature and law of 
nations which stood behind this rationale.53
The second argument was founded on the general notion of the nature of human 
society which was directed toward justice and not injustice and the third was built 
around Covarruvias’ statement that any duress was sufficient to claim the act void 
before God.54
In these chapters Comitoli followed many writers from the 15th and 16th centu-
ries. Moral theologians Prierias, Angelus, Gabriel, to whom he added e.g. Domingo 
de Soto (Soto, 1495–1560), were equally important for him. Adrian of Utrecht 
(Adrianus, 1459–1523), Martín de Azpilcueta (Navarrus, 1492–1586) and Co-
varruvias were particularly relevant for him and he often relied on the teachings 
of the last two. However, in this part of Comitoli’s output the impression that he 
mainly reiterated the arguments of the others is much lesser as he developed his 
own concepts. It is important to see that in the areas which were of his particular 
interest he willingly deepened his analysis.
53 Ibidem, lib. 3, q. 3, num. 2, p. 359: Nam si me cogis metu iniusto, quicumque sit ille, tecum 
contrahere, igitur mihi iniuriam facis: ergo haec iniuria nullum tibi ius parit: imo necessitatem 
adfert et legem, ut mihi pro iniuria satisfacias. Satisfacere mihi non potes ex iustitiae commutativae 
praescripto, nisi me in integrum restituas: et id, in quo me laesisti, reddas: lasisti autem in contra-
hendi libertate: ergo pro infecto habere debes, quod inter nos factum est: alioquin in pristinum ego 
statum non redirem libertatis meae. Praeterea, sublata proprietate contractus, quae illi quovis iure 
est necessaria, tollitur contractus: sed in nostro volumine de contractu docuimus in maxime neces-
sariis, et intrinsecis affectionibus contracus esse libertatem, qua excluditur fraus, vis, metus, igno-
rantia: ergo quocumque modo et metu violetur haec libertas, interit contractus. Ad haec ius non ius, 
sed iniuriam rescindit; cum ergo contractus initi metu viri constantis rescindantur a iure, et a iudice 
[...], fatendum est ob iniuriam rescindi: et quia iure naturae, et gentium sunt nulli: et illius auctori-
tas ideo interponitur, primum, ut id, quod antea ignorabatur esse nullum, eius decreto irritum esse 
intelligatur: deinde, ut, qui in contrahendo iniuriosus fuit, si sua sponte nolit contractum dirimere, 
et libertatem restituere ei, qui vi est iniuriam et metum passus, coactu et imperio id iudicis faciat.
54 Ibidem, lib. 3, q. 3, num. 3–4, p. 360.
 LIBERTAS CONTRACTUS. PAOLO COMITOLI SJ ON FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 197
Keeping in mind what was Comitoli’s argument, we can now just mention 
that in Doctrina apart from the summary of his reflection from Responsa he added 
the description of a couple of cases inspired by the writings of other authors.55 
However, it does not seem that their presentation is necessary to clarify Comito-
li’s view on metus. In the next chapter he explained two specific causes of metus, 
i.e. reverentia and observantia.56 This detailed elaboration did not carry relevant 
general observations on freedom of contract, especially if we add that it was based 
on many works of other theologians.
3.4. The other vices of will
Two more chapters elaborated on the description of the second freedom of 
contract. In these chapters Comitoli added several less known vices of will. He 
introduced them in the previous chapter where he stated that it seemed right to 
conclude the reflection on the freedom of contract by discussing two other types 
of vices which disrupted parties’ consent.57 Due to their lesser significance we can 
limit to mentioning them briefly. The first type of vices was defined as adulations 
and flatteries. Comitoli, as always, quoted extensively many sources, especially 
the classics of Roman literature. The short conclusion of his analysis is that such 
practices did not result in the nullity of contract, unless they led to error or deceit.58 
Some curious ideas were discussed in the last chapter, where Comitoli considered 
the influence of importunate claims on contractual freedom. At the end he once 
again stressed that this attribute of contract was the most excellent of all attributes.59
3.5. Voluntariness: summary
We can now shortly sum up Comitoli’s attitude towards the second type of 
freedom of contract. Comitoli paid special attention to three vices of will, ignoran-
tia, dolus and metus, however, he presented them as duplex sets of vices (together 
with error, fraus and vis, respectively). To these vices he added another two which 
were of less importance. Three general observations may be made in respect of 
voluntariness. Firstly, this type of contractual freedom served Comitoli to express 
55 P. Comitoli, Doctrina, pars 2, cap. 10, num. 3–4, pp. 84–85.
56 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 11, pp. 85–88.
57 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 11, num. 9, p. 88: Cogitanti mihi institutionem de libertate contractus 
non longius ducere, inter differendum duo alia genera oblata sunt, quibus liber contrahentium con-
sensus saepenumero perturbati solitus est. Alterum est blanditiarum, adulationum, assentationum: 
alterum importunarum precum. Omnis igitur de libertate contractus disputatio ad exitum adducta 
erit, cum locus de blanditiis et assentationibus, deinde de precibus importunis, breviter ac lucide 
fuerit pertractatus, id quod duobus consequentibus capitibus exequemur.
58 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 12, num. 6, pp. 90–91.
59 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 13, num. 6, pp. 92–93.
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the central role of consent for contract as a result of dialoguing wills. It was a con-
sequence of his definition of contract and he stressed it many times throughout 
his discourse. Secondly, the Jesuit repeated a couple of times it was by no means 
possible that ius would arise from iniuria. Therefore, it was necessary to deny 
effectiveness from all contracts entered with any lack of voluntariness. Thirdly, as 
contracts were voluntary obligations the requirements to ensure they were entered 
voluntarily were absolute. There was no place left for any infringement of parties’ 
voluntariness. Otherwise, the contracts were declared void. Voluntariness of contract 
played a crucial role in Comitoli’s general contract doctrine.
4. THE THIRD: FREEDOM OF OWNERSHIP  
(LIBERTAS DOMINII)
The reader encouraged by Comitoli’s clear division of contractual freedom 
into three types must feel a kind of disappointment while noticing that after several 
chapters on the vices of will there is nothing more said about the third type of con-
tractual freedom. Except for its mentioning at the beginning of the description of 
the third attribute of contract, Comitoli said nothing more about libertas dominii at 
this point. As it comes without any particular explanation it gives the impression of 
a doctrinal shortcoming. However, there is at least one possible approach to catch 
the idea which lied behind the phrase libertas dominii.
It seems just to look for the meaning of this phrase in the concluding chapters 
of the second part of Doctrina, where Comitoli described the last attribute of 
contract, namely translatio dominii.60 In terms of the number of pages dedicated 
to its description it was even longer than the one provided for libertas contractus. 
Additionally, the chapters dedicated to this topic were given even a separate head-
ing. Typically, Comitoli offered the reader a bunch of definitions of the discussed 
term and the study on the difference between dominium and ius dominii.61 On this 
basis he proposed his own definition, according to which dominium was potestas 
rei efficiendae, conservandae, habendae, possidendae, utendae, et quoquo modo 
transferendae.62 In general it is worth noting that creation of such a close relation 
between contract law and property law is another aspect of Comitoli’s thought which 
strikingly resembles the modern jurisprudence. It is similar e.g. to the discussions 
from common law on the nature of contract and contractual obligation and the 
60 For general remarks on the ownership in the late scholasticism see e.g. P. Grossi, La pro-
prietà nel sistema privatistico della seconda scolastica [in:] P. Grossi (ed.), La Seconda Scolastica 
nella formazione del diritto privato moderno. Atti dell’incontro di studio (Firenze, 16–19 ottobre 
1972), Milano 1972, pp. 117–222.
61 P. Comitoli, Doctrina, pars 2, cap. 29, num. 1–8, pp. 150–152.
62 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 29, num. 8, p. 152.
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difference between contract law and property law. According to some theories, we 
can even try to grasp the characteristics of contract law by the application of the 
language taken from property law.63
As there was no specific reference to the third type of freedom of contract in 
the chapters dedicated to the third attribute, it seems justified to connect the phrase 
libertas dominii with the part of Doctrina describing the last attribute, translatio 
dominii. However, there are no clear indications whether it was something Comitoli 
himself expected from the reader. The last chapters of the second part of Doctrina 
also lack a clear reference to libertas dominii. In the very last chapter on translatio 
dominii Comitoli explained why it should be seen as an attribute of contract.64 He 
claimed that it was justified to see the subject of contract as a transfer of ownership 
in various ways. It did not necessarily mean that in every contract there happened 
a real change of owner, but with some more detailed divisions of ownership and the 
right to a thing he managed to defend his point. The transfer of property resulted 
from the action of human wills, which only together were able to create consent, 
i.e. the basis for contract. For Comitoli it was clear that this consent embraced also 
the intention of one party to transfer the ownership of a thing to the other one.65 
On the margin of his argument – while he discussed the contract as a function of 
commutative justice – he mentioned the division of contracts according to these 
transferring dominium or usus. Contract seen as an exchange required the trans-
fer of ownership and this transfer was obvious in contracts which were rooted in 
liberalitas to which he counted emptio venditio, permutatio, locatio conductio, 
societas.66 Liberalitas is not the same as libertas, but this is probably the phrase 
which is the closest to libertas dominii.
Taking this type of contractual freedom more broadly in the context of Comi-
toli’s doctrine we may say that it was a case similar to libertas voluntatis. It was 
artificially extracted by the Jesuit to make his concept of libertas contractus more 
complex. He did not elaborate on this type of libertas but he probably saw its 
importance as an initial requirement to introduce tranlatio dominii as an attribute. 
Transfer of the ownership was the core of the formal cause from his contract 
definition as it was element of the externally expressed sign of contract. However, 
to enable the transfer via consent of parties’ wills it was necessary to grant them 
a freedom in their ability to dispose of ownership. In this respect libertas dominii 
was a general view on humans’ right to use things given to them freely. For Comi-
toli – who discussed in his argument on dominium also such general issues as 
natural divisions of things – it might have been important to stress even this facet 
of contractual freedom.
63 See e.g. S.A. Smith, Contract Theory, Oxford 2007, pp. 97–103.
64 P. Comitoli, Doctrina, pars 2, cap. 37, pp. 187–189.
65 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 37, num. 1, p. 187.
66 Ibidem, pars 2, cap. 37, num. 2, pp. 187–188.
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CONCLUSIONS
In his works Paolo Comitoli emphasised the significance of libertas contractus 
as an attribute of contract several times. Having examined his concept of freedom 
of contract we may say that it was indeed placed in the centre of his doctrine. It was 
the attribute which was strictly connected to the efficient cause of contract, i.e. to 
the wills of parties. For Comitoli it was clear that consent of wills, properly made 
and expressed, was the basis of contract. Therefore he defined a lot of requirements 
which parties’ wills had to meet to secure the social function of contract. The free-
dom of contract was developed by Comitoli to grasp some of these requirements. 
This freedom was threefold: free will as a prerequisite, voluntariness due to the 
voluntary character of private obligation and freedom of ownership as an initial 
condition enabling to transfer the object of contract. The first and the last type of 
freedom were somewhat artificially extracted by the Jesuit to add the depth to his 
concept of libertas contractus.
It was a concept developed by a moral theologian and he focused on some issues 
of little importance for law itself. Therefore, in many points Comitoli relied on the 
works of others and he combined various approaches present in the jurisprudence 
with a little additions of himself. In some points he was especially dependant on 
local authors, which allows us to call his doctrine a parochial one. It was founded 
on the literature of its time, but there were only occasionally important novelties to 
the old doctrine and the influence of Comitoli on the later scholarship was scant. By 
no means did he intend to produce a brand new doctrine of contract. Yet, his specific 
erudite attitude to sources and methodological tendency to order the argument led 
at the same time to the creation of some interesting legal ideas.
However, it was voluntariness that was the core of contractual freedom for 
Comitoli. He built a coherent concept linking the function of contract as a tool of 
commutative justice with voluntariness as the set of requirements guaranteeing 
the freedom of parties to contract. He demanded from parties’ consent absolute 
voluntariness, not disturbed by any vices. By recognizing the wills of parties as 
sole creators of consensual form of contract Comitoli was a forerunner of the 
school of natural law. It is hardly possible that he inspired Grotius or Pufendorf, 
but his doctrinal output may be seen as an intriguing outline of the future model 
of contract due to his praise of parties’ wills which create voluntary consent as the 
main cause of contract.67
67 This idea was articulated in A. Giuliani, Tre giuristi perugini cinquecenteschi: Giovan Paolo 
Lancellotti, Paolo Comitoli, Benincasio Benincasa [in:] G. Barberini (ed.), Giuristi dell’Università 
di Perugia: contributi per il VII centenario dell’ateneo, Roma 2010, p. 250.
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Abstract
The paper presents the results of research devoted to the concept of freedom of contract 
in the writings of an early modern Italian Jesuit, Paolo Comitoli. He claimed that freedom 
of contract was one of the attributes of contract and it was essential for the consent of 
parties entering into a contract. He distinguished between three types of this freedom. 
Freedom of will was a prerequisite in case of any and all human actions including contracts. 
Voluntariness was a requirement for the parties’ wills creating consent to be the result of 
a voluntary decision, not disturbed by any vices. Freedom of ownership enabled the parties 
to conduct a transfer of the object of contract in its broadly understood sense. Comitoli’s 
concept of contractual freedom was an expression of his belief that voluntary consent of 
the wills of the parties as the foundation of contractual consent was the basis and the main 
cause of a contract. 
Keywords: freedom of contract, contract theory, vices of will, moral theology 
